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ABSTRACT
Even while we widely recognize legal liability for physical injury, we
frequently discount mental, emotional, and psychological injury. We
disfavor tort liability for emotional distress; we prohibit prisoners from
suing for purely psychological injuries; and we tax the damages victims of
emotional injury receive even while leaving damages for physical injury
untaxed. This Article argues that neuroscientific, psychological, and
technological advances challenge our traditional ideas about the set of
injuries that are possible and that merit legal redress. The Article goes on
to contend that, while these advances challenge our traditional ideas, they
do not inevitably overturn traditional distinctions within tort law. Rather,
they present the task of critically examining and clarifying the normative
foundations of distinctions we have historically taken for granted, and
considering whether those distinctions survive that searching examination.
Part I defines what I call “mind-dependent” injury and presents a set of
test cases that challenge current legal approaches to injury and
compensation, and discusses the neuroscientific, psychological, and
technical underpinnings that moved these cases from science fiction into
scientific reality. Part II reviews and examines several legal contexts that
distinguish different types of injury and that provide legal remedies for
some but not others. Part III considers normative justifications that might
be offered for this differentiation, particularly in light of the new
information we have. Ultimately, I argue that while new knowledge may
require us to reevaluate the distinctions we traditionally have drawn, it
does not completely undermine the possibility of normative distinctions
between different types of injury. However, it challenges us to better defend
those distinctions and ultimately should lead us to abandon the bifurcation
between “emotional” and “physical” injuries in favor of a more nuanced
approach.
INTRODUCTION
Neal Stephenson’s Snow Crash has us imagine (among other things) a
universe where hearing the wrong story could reduce you to permanent
gibberish, while David Langford’s comp.basilisk FAQ presents us with an
image that kills.1 A century earlier, Mark Twain’s A Literary Nightmare
introduced us to a song that incapacitates, and Robert Chambers’s The
Repairer of Reputations gave us a world in which reading a book could

1. NEAL STEPHENSON, SNOW CRASH (1992); David Langford, comp.basilisk FAQ, 402 NATURE
465, 465 (1999).
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cause insanity.2 In worlds like these—where both our vulnerabilities and
our ability to injure others are very different—the law of redress for
personal injury might look very different.
But those worlds are not ours. The paradigm cases of legal
compensation for personal injury do not involve words, images, or events
acting at a distance or via people’s mental faculties—but rather involve
interactions between people’s bodies and (as the philosopher John Austin
called them) “moderate-sized specimens of dry goods.”3 Sometimes, as in
Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad Co., the chain of interactions leading
from tortfeasor to victim recalls a Rube Goldberg machine.4 At other
times—such as Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno’s exploding
bottle, or Byrne v. Boadle’s flour barrel—the chain is short and simple.5
These cases seem, at first glance, to reflect a fact about shared human
vulnerability: regardless of our knowledge, wisdom, power, or experience,
our bodies remain remarkably frail, liable to irreparable injury from a shard
of glass, a sharp kick, or even water heated to the wrong temperature.
Perhaps for this reason, even while we widely recognize liability for
physical injury, we frequently discount mental, emotional, and
psychological injury. We regard tort liability for emotional distress as
disfavored;6 we prohibit prisoners from suing for purely psychological
injuries;7 and we tax the damages victims of emotional injury receive while
leaving damages for physical injury untaxed.8
First, this Article argues that neuroscientific, psychological, and
technological advances challenge our traditional ideas about the set of
injuries that are possible and that merit legal redress. Taken together, they
suggest that the reality of injury lies somewhere between Stephenson’s and
Twain’s worlds—full of jeopardy from lethal texts, incapacitating images,
and tort law’s narrative of people imperiled by falling packages and flour
barrels. The Article goes on to contend that while these advances challenge
our traditional ideas, they do not inevitably overturn the existing law of
tort. Rather, they present us the task of critically examining and clarifying
the normative foundations of distinctions we have historically taken for
2. Mark Twain, A Literary Nightmare, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Feb. 1867, at 167–69; Robert W.
Chambers, The Repairer of Reputations, in THE KING IN YELLOW (1895).
3. JOHN L. AUSTIN, SENSE & SENSIBILIA: RECONSTRUCTED FROM THE MANUSCRIPT NOTES BY
G.J. WARLOCK 8 (1962).
4. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928).
5. Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno, 150 P.2d 436 (Cal. 1944); Byrne v. Boadle, 159
E.R. 299, 1863 WL 6189 (1863).
6. E.g., Turley v. ISG Lackawanna, Inc., 774 F.3d 140, 158 (2d Cir. 2014) (applying New York
law); Benson ex rel. Benson v. Minn. Bd. of Med. Practice, 526 N.W.2d 634, 637 (Minn. Ct. App.
1995) (collecting authorities).
7. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e) (2015).
8. 26 U.S.C. § 104(a)(2) (2015); cf. Comm’r v. Schleier, 515 U.S. 323, 329 (1995).
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granted, and considering whether those distinctions survive that searching
examination.
This Article is among the first pieces of legal scholarship to examine
the impact of these new scientific discoveries on tort liability for mental,
emotional, and psychological injury. A few others have noted that these
scientific developments could have significant impact on law, but have
focused on different areas—criminal law or the determination of
damages9—or have focused on noting the connection rather than examining
the normative implications in depth.10
Part I defines what I call “mind-dependence” and presents a set of test
cases that challenge current legal approaches to injury and compensation,
and discusses the neuroscientific, psychological, and technical
underpinnings that moved these cases from science fiction into scientific
reality. Part II reviews and examines several legal contexts that distinguish
different types of injury and that provide legal remedies for some, but not
for others. Part III considers normative justifications that might be offered
for this distinction, particularly in light of the new information we have.
Ultimately, while new knowledge may require us to evaluate the
distinctions we traditionally have drawn, it does not completely undermine
the possibility of normative distinctions between different types of injury.
However, it challenges us to better defend those distinctions, and should
lead us to abandon the bifurcation between “emotional” and “physical”
injuries in favor of a more nuanced approach.
A brief note on language: finding a single term to encompass the
categories of injury I discuss below is challenging.11 Terms like
“emotional,” “psychological,” or “mental” seem too narrow, since many of
the injuries I discuss do not involve the emotions as we now understand
them. Meanwhile, “nonphysical” seems to beg the question, since some of
the cases I discuss argue that all injuries are in some sense physical.
Instead, the umbrella term I will adopt in what follows is more of a
mouthful: body-bypassing mind-dependent injury. In the fictional cases
above, and the potentially real ones I will discuss next, the injuring conduct
skips past the outer shield of the human body to visit its effects on the
injured party’s mind (or, in one case, on a processing device implanted in
the injured party). The conduct in Byrne v. Boadle and Escola, in contrast,
produces pain by first harming the body’s fragile exterior.
9. E.g., Adam J. Kolber, Will There Be A Neurolaw Revolution?, 89 IND. L.J. 807, 831 (2014);
Francis X. Shen, Sentencing Enhancement and the Crime Victim’s Brain, 46 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 405
(2014); Francis X. Shen, Mind, Body, and the Criminal Law, 97 MINN. L. REV. 2036 (2013).
10. E.g., Shaun Cassin, Comment, Eggshell Minds and Invisible Injuries: Can Neuroscience
Challenge Longstanding Treatment of Tort Injuries?, 50 HOUS. L. REV. 929 (2013).
11. Others have wrestled with this issue of nomenclature as well; see, for example, Nancy Levit,
Ethereal Torts, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 136, 181–82 (1992).
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I. SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND MIND-DEPENDENT INJURY
A. Mind-Dependence in the Law
Despite the centrality of the concept of mind-dependence in
philosophical discussions, much less attention has been paid to that concept
in the law, particularly as it regards physical injury. No cases refer to the
idea of mind-dependence, and only a few legal commentators mention it.12
In this subpart, I provide a brief summary of the treatment of this concept
in the legal literature, and then turn to a fuller explication of it.
Some legal commentators have regarded the concept of minddependence as applying broadly to human experience in general, including
conscious experience, human will, and law itself.13 This view seems highly
plausible, in particular regarding the proximate rather than the ultimate
cause of these phenomena: rejecting the notion that law, will, and
experience are in some sense a product of the mind requires positing some
other proximate source—and none is readily forthcoming. Others have
posited with equal plausibility that, while various phenomena are minddependent, some (such as fundamental laws of science) are not.14 One of
the most prominent debates involving mind-dependence concerns whether
normative facts, such as moral or legal facts, are mind-dependent or mindindependent.15

12. E.g., Dennis J. Baker, The Impossibility of a Critically Objective Criminal Law, 56 MCGILL
L.J. 349, 368 (2011).
13. Hugh Gibbons & Nicholas Skinner, The Biological Basis of Human Rights, 13 B.U. PUB.
INT. L.J. 51, 57 (2003) (stating that “conscious states are subjective (mind-dependent) ontological
features of the actual world”); id. at 59 (“The will is a mind-dependent feature of the ontological
landscape. This means that the will exhibits the subjective ontology of other conscious states like pain,
and thirst. In other words, the will exists only in so far as it is being experienced. Subtract minds from
our world and the will disappears as well. Yet the will’s ontological dependence on the mind does not
undermine its actuality.”); see also Dennis J. Baker & Lucy X. Zhao, Responsibility Links, Fair
Labeling, and Proportionality in China: Comparing China’s Criminal Law Theory and Doctrine, 14
UCLA J. INT’L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 275, 316 (2009) (“Blame and fault are mind-dependent,
conventionally contingent moral concepts that have evolved from human rationality . . . .”).
14. David L. Faigman, Scientific Realism in Constitutional Law, 73 BROOK. L. REV. 1067, 1069
(2008); Stephen J. Morse, An Accurate Diagnosis, But Is There A Cure?: An Appreciation of The Role
of Science in Law by Robin Feldman, 3 HASTINGS SCI. & TECH. L.J. 157, 159 (2011) (“There is a real,
physical world that is mind independent and this matters.”).
15. For debates regarding the mind-dependence of moral facts, see, for example, Michael S.
Moore, Remembrance of Things Past, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 239, 245 (2000) (discussing “the moral realist
thesis,” which “asserts that moral values exist and that their existence is ‘mind-independent’”); Stephen
J. Morse, Reason, Results, and Criminal Responsibility, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 363, 382–83 (2004)
(noting that some theorists “believe that morality is a human construction that cannot be justified by
appeal to an external, mind-independent source of moral authority”). For debates regarding the mindindependence of legal facts, see, for example, James Allan, Jeremy Waldron and the Philosopher’s
Stone, 45 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 133, 141 (2008); Florian F. Hoffmann, “Shooting into the Dark”:
Toward A Pragmatic Theory of Human Rights (Activism), 41 TEX. INT’L L.J. 403, 407 (2006).
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I take no position on the above issues here. In contrast, what I focus on
in this Article is the usefulness of mind-dependence, as a concept, to
demarcate certain categories of injuries. The injuries in Byrne and Escola
not only injure the body first, but rely in no essential way on the details of
the human mind. A falling barrel or a glass shard could just as well injure
or disable a mindless human or a non-human organism as it could a
paradigm-human. Indeed, such destructive events can also physically
damage and destroy inanimate property—an occurrence frequently
described in case law as involving “injury” to that property.16 In contrast,
the injuries I discuss next operate by exploiting vulnerabilities in the mind
itself. They are, in that sense, mind-dependent.
Though philosophers discussing mind-dependence have frequently
focused on issues similar to those examined in legal literature, they have
occasionally employed the concept or related concepts to discuss the moral
valence of injuries. The most sustained discussion in the philosophical
literature (which I return to in Part III) is Judith Jarvis Thomson’s
distinction between “belief-mediated distress”—that is, distress that is
dependent on one’s beliefs, which are in turn features of one’s mind—and
other forms of distress.17 This distinction has made its way into legal
scholarship in a variety of contexts.18
B. Test Cases
To focus our attention, I suggest a variety of test cases in which a
defendant’s conduct causes injury to a putative plaintiff, but where the
mechanism by which the injury is caused involves the defendant’s mind
(or, in one case, an information-processing device implanted in the
defendant’s body).
1. EPILEPSY: An avant-garde online art display incorporates rapidly
flashing images. The display earns praise for the way that the
flashing images represent ephemerality. But it also triggers seizures
in a few viewers with preexisting photosensitive epilepsy.

16. E.g., Prairie State Loan & Trust Co. v. Doig, 70 Ill. 52, 53 (Ill. 1873) (“This action was to
recover for injury to property of appellees, caused by the falling of a derrick.”).
17. See infra Part III; JUDITH JARVIS THOMSON, THE REALM OF RIGHTS (1990).
18. E.g., Matthew D. Adler, Against “Individual Risk”: A Sympathetic Critique of Risk
Assessment, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1121, 1227 (2005) (discussing Thomson’s work in context of right not
to be subjected to unreasonable risks); Vincent J. Samar, The First Amendment and the Mind/Body
Problem, 41 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 521, 536 (2008) (rejecting bans on same-sex marriage on the basis
that there is not “sufficient and credible evidence to suggest same-sex marriage is harmful in a nonbelief mediated way”); Frederick Schauer, Harm(s) and the First Amendment, 2011 SUP. CT. REV. 81,
82.
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2. PACEMAKER: New implantable cardiac pacemakers are equipped
with wireless technology, which allows physicians to collect
information about their patients’ health. But they also make it
possible for others to transmit specific patterns of data over wireless
networks that, when received, cause the pacemaker to malfunction
and harm or kill the patient.
3. BULLYING: An abusive employer repeatedly tells an employee that
she is worthless. During the lawsuit, the employee’s lawyer
demonstrates—through updated, functional MRI evidence—that
telling someone they are worthless causes their brain to change for
the worse.
4. TRIGGER WARNING: A municipality requires newspapers and
magazines distributed within its boundaries to preface descriptions of
self-injury by individuals with a “trigger warning” that informs
readers that the description depicts events that may trigger negative
thoughts and cause individuals to harm themselves.
C. Scientific Background
The situations above may be unlikely ones so far, but they are clearly
possible. There is scientific evidence that visual perception of certain
phenomena can trigger an epileptic response in vulnerable individuals. This
phenomenon, known as photosensitive epilepsy, has been documented and
studied since the 1880s.19 The mechanism by which this response occurs is
not perfectly understood, but is thought to involve the sustained activity of
numerous neurons in the visual cortex in response to the viewed stimulus,
which eventually overwhelm normal mechanisms of inhibition and lead to
large-scale synchronous firing of neurons.20 The condition is thought to be
partially inheritable.21 Triggers for seizures include flashing lights at certain
frequencies, particularly in red color, as well as patterns of parallel lines,
stripes, or gratings.22 Evidence of photosensitive epilepsy has been
accepted into and noted by courts.23 Further, malicious hackers have
19. Robert S. Fisher et al., Photic- and Pattern-induced Seizures: A Review for the Epilepsy
Foundation of America Working Group, 46 EPILEPSIA 1426 (2005).
20. Id. at 1430–31.
21. Id. at 1429.
22. Id. at 1432–33.
23. See, e.g., Mantolete v. Bolger, 767 F.2d 1416, 1419 (9th Cir. 1985), as amended (Aug. 27,
1985) (noting a “propensity in certain epileptics to be sensitive to flashing lights so as to cause
seizures”); Green v. Astrue, No. 08 CIV. 8435 LAP FM, 2012 WL 1414294, at *18 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 24,
2012), report and recommendation adopted, No. 08 CIV. 8435 LAP FM, 2012 WL 3069570 (S.D.N.Y.
July 26, 2012) (observing that “a relatively small number of epileptics can have their seizures triggered
by flashing or flickering lights”); Garavito v. City of Tampa, 640 F. Supp. 2d 1374, 1378 (M.D. Fla.
2009) (discussing “a photoparoxysmal response or photosensitive epilepsy, which would cause a
seizure in response to sirens or lights”); Access Now, Inc. v. Ambulatory Surgery Ctr. Grp., 146 F.
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“compromised epilepsy support websites by posting animated images on
these websites that caused photosensitive epilepsy patients to experience
pain and seizures.”24
Although no “pacemaker hack” is yet known to have occurred, several
proof-of-concept demonstrations have been presented by computer
scientists. Among the devices where a proof-of-concept demonstration,
involving malfunction caused by the transmission of harmful data, has been
completed include implantable cardiac defibrillators25 and insulin pumps.26
A variety of other devices could also be at risk, such as deep brain and
other neural stimulators; implants and prostheses such as cochlear implants
and retinal prostheses; and gastric electrical stimulators.27 Two recent law
review articles have briefly noted this development,28 as has a 2012 report
by the federal Government Accountability Office.29 And a patent
application has even been filed for an implantable medical device that is
hardened against the introduction of malware or viruses.30
The development of functional magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) and
other technologies has brought us closer to a situation where the neural
traces of emotional and mental experiences can be made identifiable. A
recent study identified the short-term, medium-term, and long-term effects
of stressful experiences on neural connections in the brain, and noted that

Supp. 2d 1334, 1338 (S.D. Fla. 2001) (observing that “some types of visual alarms may trigger seizures
in patients”); Rackley v. Coastal Painting, 570 S.E.2d 121, 122–23 (N.C. Ct. App. 2002) (noting that
plaintiff’s “seizures, which are grand mal seizures, are triggered by flashing lights and have occurred
when he has played video games or seen the sun breaking through trees”).
24. Tamara Denning et al., Patients, Pacemakers, and Implantable Defibrillators: Human Values
and Security for Wireless Implantable Medical Devices, Proceedings of the SIGCHI Conference on
Human
Factors
in
Computing
Systems,
Atlanta,
Georgia
917,
917
(2010),
https://seclab.cs.washington.edu/pubs/pdfs/chi2010-patients.pdf.
25. Tamara Denning et al., Neurosecurity: Security and Privacy For Neural Devices, 27
NEUROSURG FOCUS 1, 2 (E7, 2009) (asserting that “a third party, using his or her own homemade and
low-cost equipment, could wirelessly change a patient’s therapies, disable therapies altogether, and
induce ventricular fibrillation (a potentially fatal heart rhythm)”).
26. C. Li, A. Raghunathan & N. K. Jha, Hijacking an Insulin Pump: Security Attacks and
Defenses for a Diabetes Therapy System, Proceedings of the IEEE International Conference on e-Health
Networking Applications and Service 150–156 (June 2011), http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/xpls/abs_all.jsp?
arnumber=6026732.
27. M. Zhang, A. Raghunathan & N. K. Jha, Towards Trustworthy Medical Devices and Body
Area Networks, Proceedings of the 50th Annual Design Automation Conference 14:1–14:6 (2013),
http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=2488751.
28. Andrea M. Matwyshyn, Hacking Speech: Informational Speech and the First Amendment,
107 NW. U. L. REV. 795, 818 (2013); Katherine Booth Wellington, Cyberattacks on Medical Devices
and Hospital Networks: Legal Gaps and Regulatory Solutions, 30 SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J. 139,
142 (2014).
29.
GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, FDA SHOULD EXPAND ITS CONSIDERATION OF
INFORMATION SECURITY FOR CERTAIN TYPES OF DEVICES (2012), http://www.gao.gov/assets/
650/647767.pdf.
30. Secure Operation of Implanted Device, U.S. Patent Application No. 12,150,934 (filed Apr.
30, 2008).
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connections between two areas of the brain, the amygdala and
hippocampus, remained elevated as long as two hours after the stressful
event.31 Another study identified the long-term persistence of negative or
positive associations with the faces of people with whom participants had
had hostile or friendly encounters in the past.32 Still other work notes the
indelibility of emotional memories, and the potential for reactivating them
years after the original event.33 While the fact that memorable emotional
events have a permanent neural correlate should not be surprising, our
capacity to identify the biological correlates of emotional experience makes
it clear that being subjected to stress or abuse can lead to objectively
identifiable changes in the brain. A few legal scholars have noted and
discussed this development.34
Finally, recent debates about harmful speech and post-traumatic stress
disorder have made the issue of “trigger warnings” highly salient.
Psychological research has shown that certain words, images, and phrases
may cause survivors of traumatic experiences to experience “intrusive
cognition,” or unpleasant memories of the past event.35 For example,
exposing military veterans with post-traumatic stress disorder to “scenes of
traumatic events (e.g., battlefield casualties) intermixed with neutral
images, an emotional faces task, and a verbal task that contained neutral as
well as salient trigger words (such as ‘Kandahar’ and ‘grenade’),”
exacerbated existing atypical connectivity between brain regions in these
patients.36 On the basis of similar findings, a recent medical article argued
for removing certain terms, such as “incest,” from the health literacy tests
used in typical practice.37 An alternative is the “trigger warning,” where
text that includes terms that may cause unpleasant or traumatic

31. Sharon Vaisvaser et al., Neural Traces of Stress: Cortisol Related Sustained Enhancement of
Amygdala-Hippocampal Functional Connectivity, 7 FRONTIERS HUMAN NEUROSCI. art. 313: 1, 9
(2013).
32. Pascal Vrtička et al., Memory for Friends or Foes: The Social Context of Past Encounters
with Faces Modulates Their Subsequent Neural Traces in the Brain, 4 SOC. NEUROSCI. 384, 395–98
(2009).
33. Joseph E. LeDoux, Emotion as Memory: Anatomical Systems Underlying Indelible Neural
Traces, in THE HANDBOOK OF EMOTION & MEMORY 279–80 (Sven-Ake Christenson ed. 1992).
34. Tracy Rightmer, Arrested Development: Juveniles’ Immature Brains Make Them Less
Culpable Than Adults, 9 QUINNIPIAC HEALTH L.J. 1, 30–31 (2005) (reviewing scientific studies that
document the brain traces of abuse).
35. Richard J. McNally, Implicit and Explicit Memory for Trauma-Related Information in PTSD,
821 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 219 (1997); Karen Lynn Cassiday et al., Cognitive Processing of Trauma
Cues in Rape Victims with Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, 16 COGNITIVE THERAPY & RES. 283, 292–
94 (1992).
36. B.T. Dunkley et al., Resting-State Hippocampal Connectivity Correlates with Symptom
Severity in Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, 5 NEUROIMAGE: CLINICAL 377, 378 (2014).
37. Alisa K. Lincoln et al., The Need for Trauma-Sensitive Language Use in Literacy and Health
Literacy Screening Instruments, 18 J. HEALTH COMMC’N 15, 18 (2013).
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recollections is prefaced by a warning or disclaimer. A student note
presents the text of such a warning:
You are the only one responsible for yourself, just as I am
responsible only for me. . . . [K]now that this site contains
extremities [sic] which may be triggering or harmful if they happen
to exceed your boundaries. If you have or are recovering from an
eating disorder or self-injury, know that this may not be a safe
place for you to be and think carefully before proceeding.38
At least one administrative decision has credited concerns about the
“triggering” of post-traumatic stress disorder by imagery.39 Recently, the
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania upheld a prohibition
on presenting a potentially upsetting poster outside a veterans affairs
hospital40—plausibly on the basis of concerns about triggering PTSD41—
but the conviction was reversed on appeal because the poster presentation
was found to have occurred in a public forum.42
II. TENSIONS WITH CURRENT DOCTRINE
The above cases illuminate some challenges within existing legal
doctrine. In this part, I focus on the challenges posed for the legal doctrine
in four areas. First, mind-dependent injuries challenge aspects of product
liability law that distinguish injuries with “intangible” causes from those
with tangible causes. Second, as might be expected, mind-dependent
injuries pose problems for the First Amendment’s guarantee of freedom of
expression. Third, mind-dependent injuries complicate the justification for
disfavoring the tort of infliction of emotional distress. Fourth, minddependent injuries call into question the underlying justification of the

38. Annika K. Martin, Note, Stick A Toothbrush Down Your Throat: An Analysis of the Potential
Liability of Pro-Eating Disorder Websites, 14 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 151, 174–75 (2005) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
39. [Title Redacted by Agency], Bd. Vet. App. 0513606 (May 19, 2005) (noting that “the veteran
reported that he was unable to watch any war related news for fear of triggering his PTSD”).
40. United States v. O’Neal, No. CIV.A. 04-MJ-01060, 2007 WL 3342375, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Nov.
8, 2007), rev’d, 431 F. App’x 128 (3d Cir. 2011).
41. Testimony at trial appealed to the risk of triggering:
Q. How are psychiatric patients protected by prohibiting political speech adjacent to the
main entrance to the VA Medical Center? A. We do have PTSD [post-traumatic syndrome
disorder] patients that respond to the hospital on an outpatient basis. They would see a
Presidential election campaign poster such as this, mentioning Vietnam, things of that
nature, it could trigger a past experience that a veteran may have had.
Brief of Appellee at 22, United States v. O’Neal, 431 F. App’x 128 (3d Cir. 2011) (No. 07-4394), 2011
WL 6968023.
42. O’Neal, 431 F. App’x at 129.
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numerous statutes that treat “physical injury” differently from other
categories of injury.
A. Tangibility and Product Liability
Product liability law has drawn an explicit distinction between injuries
caused by tangible objects and those with intangible causes. In James v.
Meow Media—a case considering whether media companies could be liable
to the victims of a school shooting—the Sixth Circuit reviewed a variety of
product liability cases that draw a tangible-intangible distinction:
Certainly if a video cassette exploded and injured its user, we
would hold it a “product” and its producer strictly liable for the
user’s physical damages. In this case, however, James is arguing
that the words and images purveyed on the tangible cassettes,
cartridges, and perhaps even the electrical pulses through the
internet, caused Carneal to snap and to effect the deaths of the
victims. When dealing with ideas and images, courts have been
willing to separate the sense in which the tangible containers of
those ideas are products from their communicative element for
purposes of strict liability. . . . We find these decisions well
reasoned. The video game cartridges, movie cassette, and internet
transmissions are not sufficiently “tangible” to constitute products
in the sense of their communicative content.43
The test cases discussed in Part I, EPILEPSY and PACEMAKER, represent an
intermediate scenario between the actual facts of Meow Media and the
exploding-cassette hypothetical. The Meow Media plaintiffs alleged
indirect harm from hazardous products: they alleged that hazardous video
games, movies, and websites affected a school shooter, who in turn shot
their children. In contrast, the plaintiffs in EPILEPSY and PACEMAKER
alleged direct harm: that hazardous images or data transmissions directly
harmed their health. However, unlike the exploding-cassette hypothetical,
the direct injuries in EPILEPSY and PACEMAKER are traceable not to the
product’s tangible container, but are caused by intangible and
communicative phenomena.
Some jurists suggest (as Meow Media seems to) that product liability
can only apply to injuries from a straightforwardly physical source—that
“[i]n the products liability area, the imposition of strict liability is meant to
impact on the economic decisions that manufacturers make about cold,

43. James v. Meow Media, Inc., 300 F.3d 683, 701 (6th Cir. 2002) (internal citations omitted).
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tangible products made of metal, steel, iron, plastic and rubber.”44 But
product liability has also been applied to injuries stemming from an
intangible source. For example, an electric company can be subject to
product liability when it distributes electricity at an excessively high
voltage, even though electricity is intangible.45 Some have argued that
companies could also be strictly liable for injuries caused by magnetic
fields should such fields prove hazardous.46
The more complicated questions involve liability for injuries that have
both intangible and mind-dependent aspects. Courts have imposed liability
for injuries caused by misinformation in aeronautical charts.47 Some courts
have suggested that other information-containing products, such as medical
instructions and computer software, could potentially be products for
liability purposes.48 Other courts, however, have refused to impose product
liability on the producers of other forms of information, such as field
guides for mushroom harvesting,49 diet books,50 and medical textbooks.51
Perhaps the most prominent case limiting liability for intangible,
communicative sources of harm is Winter v. G.P. Putnam’s Sons, where the
Ninth Circuit held that the intangible aspects of physical objects, such as
the information contained within a book, were not products for the purpose
of finding product liability.52 Although the case was not a First Amendment
case, the court adverted to a policy rationale that was grounded in free
speech:
We place a high priority on the unfettered exchange of ideas. We
accept the risk that words and ideas have wings we cannot clip and
which carry them we know not where. The threat of liability
without fault (financial responsibility for our words and ideas in
the absence of fault or a special undertaking or responsibility)

44. Jansen v. Packaging Corp. of Am., 123 F.3d 490, 544 (7th Cir. 1997) (Coffey, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part.), aff’d sub nom. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998).
45. E.g., Smith v. Home Light & Power Co., 734 P.2d 1051, 1054 (Colo. 1987) (“Courts that
have addressed the issue have almost uniformly rejected the argument that electricity by its intrinsic
nature cannot be a ‘product . . . .’”); Ransome v. Wisc. Elec. Power Co., 275 N.W.2d 641, 648 (Wis.
1979); see also Charles E. Cantu, A Continuing Whimsical Search for the True Meaning of the Term
“Product” in Products Liability Litigation, 35 ST. MARY’S L.J. 341, 343 n.8 (2004) (collecting cases).
46. E.g., C. Michelle Depew, Challenging the Fields: The Case for Electromagnetic Field Injury
Tort Remedies Against Utilities, 56 U. PITT. L. REV. 441, 465 (1994).
47. E.g., Brocklesby v. United States, 767 F.2d 1288, 1295 (9th Cir. 1985); see also Winter v.
G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 938 F.2d 1033, 1035 (9th Cir. 1991) (collecting cases).
48. Coleman v. Dental Org. for Conscious Sedation, LLC, 4:10CV798 TIA, 2010 WL 5146603
(E.D. Mo. Dec. 13, 2010).
49. Winter, 938 F.2d at 1033.
50. Smith v. Linn, 563 A.2d 123, 126–27 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989), aff’d, 587 A.2d 309 (Pa. 1991).
51. Jones v. J.B. Lippincott Co., 694 F.Supp. 1216, 1217 (D. Md. 1988).
52. Winter, 938 F.2d at 1035.

6 PERSAD 1179-1216 (DO NOT DELETE)

2016]

Law, Science, and the Injured Mind

4/19/2016 1:48 PM

1191

could seriously inhibit those who wish to share thoughts and
theories.53
Similarly, in Watters v. TSR, the Sixth Circuit noted that
[T]he doctrine of strict liability has never been extended to words
or pictures. Other courts have looked in vain for decisions so
expanding the scope of the strict liability doctrine. . . . The
plaintiff’s complaint alleges that the defendant violated its duty of
ordinary care in two respects: it disseminated Dungeons & Dragons
literature to “mentally fragile persons,” and it failed to warn that
the “possible consequences” of playing the game might include
“loss of control of the mental processes.” To submit this case to a
jury on either theory, it seems to us, would be to stretch the
concepts of foreseeability and ordinary care to lengths that would
deprive them of all normal meaning. The defendant cannot be
faulted, obviously, for putting its game on the market without
attempting to ascertain the mental condition of each and every
prospective player. The only practicable way of insuring that the
game could never reach a “mentally fragile” individual would be to
refrain from selling it at all—and we are confident that the courts
of Kentucky would never permit a jury to say that simply by
marketing a parlor game, the defendant violated its duty to exercise
ordinary care.54
Another case, Herceg v. Hustler, similarly asserts that
No court has held that the written word is either an attractive
nuisance which would impose a special duty on defendant
magazine, or a dangerous instrumentality for which defendant
would be strictly liable. A magazine article is easily distinguishable
from items such as gunpowder, fireworks, gasoline and poison
which have an obvious physical effect. It is not, for example, like a
slingshot with physical properties which cause harm, and which
raises the question for a jury whether, balancing of the magnitude
of the risk against the utility of defendants conduct for society, the
risk of harm in a particular case is unreasonable.55
Watters and Winter enact a regime where those injured by certain types of
information, such as words or images, cannot recover for their injuries
53. Id.
54. Watters v. TSR, Inc., 904 F.2d 378, 381 (6th Cir. 1990).
55. Herceg v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 565 F. Supp. 802, 803 (S.D. Tex. 1983) (citation omitted).
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within a product liability regime. Herceg extends the bar against recovery
even to ordinary causes of action in tort law.
Examples like EPILEPSY, PACEMAKER, and TRIGGER WARNING pose
hard questions for the idea that intangible causes of injury—such as words
and pictures—cannot generate liability. Notably, these courts did not
simply deny that the magazine, book, or game in question in fact caused the
injury in question, either because some other cause—such as the user’s
misconduct—interposed itself between the intangible cause and the alleged
injury, or because the chain of causation between the intangible cause and
the injury was too attenuated. Rather, Watters, Winter, and Herceg all take
the position, as a matter of law, that allegations of harm stemming from
words or pictures cannot even be brought to a jury. Yet the harm from
rapidly strobing images or a wireless transmission containing a computer
virus or malware, although it stems—like the alleged harms in Waters,
Winter, and Herceg—from the content of the expression rather than its
manner, seems analogous to the harm from a loud sound or blinding light,
harms which have been treated as appropriate for product liability, or at the
very least triable by a jury. That words and pictures are not tangible in the
way that slingshots are does not obviously foreclose liability.
B. Harmful Expression and the First Amendment
Whether or not product liability law applies, the victims in EPILEPSY
and PACEMAKER could arguably bring other types of tort claims, such as
claims for negligent injury. These claims, as well as product liability
claims, would then have to survive attempts to bar them on First
Amendment grounds—that the imposition of tort liability would constitute
an impermissible restriction on freedom of expression.
The First Amendment arguably does not bar tort liability where noncommunicative aspects of a communication cause injury. For instance, “the
First Amendment does not protect the noise from a helicopter.”56 Nor,
presumably, would the First Amendment bar tort recovery where
excessively amplified music or speech damaged someone’s hearing or
disturbed property, where the light from a billboard caused a disturbance,
or where radio waves that encoded the information of an audio or musical
program caused dangerous interference.57 Although it is normatively
unclear why the First Amendment should protect individuals who cause
such harms at all, the imposition of tort liability in such cases would
56. John Copeland Nagle, The Idea of Pollution, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1, 38 (2009).
57. Tufariello v. Long Island R.R. Co., 458 F.3d 80, 84 (2d Cir. 2006); People v. Smit, 726
N.E.2d 62, 64 (Ill. App. Ct.2000) (finding that unwanted illumination with laser pointer can constitute
criminal liability for assault); Neal v. Bolton, 3:06CV17/MCR/EMT, 2008 WL 5156685, at *4 (N.D.
Fla. Dec. 9, 2008) (finding that alleged laser pointer injury survived motion for summary judgment).
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constitute an unproblematic “time, place, or manner” restriction on speech,
and thereby not violate the First Amendment.58
First Amendment doctrine is unclear regarding tort liability resulting
from expression whose content directly causes injury, as in EPILEPSY.
Some language in core First Amendment cases suggests that expression is
not protected if it directly causes injury: in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,
the Court held words that “by their very utterance inflict injury” are outside
the protection of the First Amendment,59 while in Schenck v. United States,
the Court held that the First Amendment “does not even protect a man from
an injunction against uttering words that may have all the effect of force.”60
As the Supreme Court held in R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, “Fighting words
are thus analogous to a noisy sound truck: Each is, as Justice Frankfurter
recognized, a ‘mode of speech’; both can be used to convey an idea; but
neither has, in and of itself, a claim upon the First Amendment.”61 Further,
if we accept the argument that “data is speech,” the same analysis is
applicable to PACEMAKER.62
However, courts and commentators have argued that the “inflict injury”
language in Chaplinsky was silently overruled by later cases,63 and that
language that inflicts direct injury is only legally prohibited when it also
produces a breach of the peace. The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals,
for example, noted that, “in light of the recent case law concerning words
denoting racial hate, political slurs, and slurs regarding another’s sexual
orientation, such speech is not curtailed as to the ideas or concept that the
words embody, but rather their use is curtailed under circumstances where
retaliation is likely.”64 Similarly, the Sixth Circuit observed that, “[t]he
Supreme Court has refined its holding . . . so that suppression of speech
58. Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 83 (1949) (holding that a restriction on loud sound trucks did
not violate the First Amendment).
59. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942) (fighting words doctrine).
60. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
61. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 386 (1992) (citation omitted).
62. Compare Jane Bambauer, Is Data Speech?, 66 STAN. L. REV. 57, 72 (2014) (contending that
“courts have concluded unequivocally that the communication of raw data is speech”), with Agatha M.
Cole, Note, Internet Advertising After Sorrell v. IMS Health: A Discussion on Data Privacy & the First
Amendment, 30 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 283, 305 (2012) (arguing that “treating all data as speech
seems overbroad and highly problematic”). See generally Alex Colangelo & Alana Maurushat,
Exploring the Limits of Computer Code as a Protected Form of Expression: A Suggested Approach to
Encryption, Computer Viruses, and Technological Protection Measures, 51 MCGILL L.J. 47, 68–73
(2006) (describing the application of First Amendment doctrine to the dissemination of computer
viruses); Robert Plotkin, Fighting Keywords: Translating the First Amendment to Protect Software
Speech, U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 329 (2003) (similar).
63. Purtell v. Mason, 527 F.3d 615, 624 (7th Cir. 2008) (“Although the ‘inflict-injury’ alternative
in Chaplinsky’s definition of fighting words has never been expressly overruled, the Supreme Court has
never held that the government may, consistent with the First Amendment, regulate or punish speech
that causes emotional injury but does not have a tendency to provoke an immediate breach of the
peace.”).
64. Conkle v. State, 677 So. 2d 1211, 1215 (Ala. Crim. App. 1995).
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which in no way tends to incite an immediate breach of the peace cannot be
justified under Chaplinsky’s ‘fighting words’ doctrine.”65
This narrowed interpretation has also been challenged: in the Sixth
Circuit case discussed supra, Judge Keith argued that the court should
“remand this case so that it can be determined whether the word ‘Sambo’s’
creates injury by its very utterance.”66 The First Amendment scholar
Rodney Smolla identifies the choice between these two perspectives: on
one reading,
it may be appropriate for society to prohibit and punish certain
expression because the expression itself is inherently harmful. The
words themselves are ‘bullets’ that inflict injury. No extraneous
proof of injury, no additional assessment of causation or
imminence or likelihood of damage, is required to justify laws that
penalize their utterance.67
Meanwhile, a different approach “rejects the notion that words may ever be
banned on the grounds that they are intrinsically harmful. ‘Sticks and
stones may break my bones but words will never hurt me.’”68
City of Billings v. Nelson, a recent Montana case, indicates the
continued life of both the positions Smolla discusses.69 The Billings
defendants directed a racial slur at a thirteen-year-old boy and were
charged with disorderly conduct. In upholding their conviction, the
Montana Supreme Court cited another case stating that being the target of a
racial slur “is like receiving a slap in the face. The injury is
instantaneous.”70 But it also suggested that the First Amendment only
permitted the punishment of face-to-face insults, not telephonic ones:
The potential to elicit an immediate violent response exists only
where the communication occurs face-to-face or in close physical
proximity. Telephone communications are not included within the
fighting words doctrine, because there is no possibility the listener
will react with immediate violence against the speaker.71

65. Sambo’s Restaurants, Inc. v. City of Ann Arbor, 663 F.2d 686, 694 (6th Cir. 1981).
66. Id. at 697 (Keith, J., dissenting).
67. Rodney A. Smolla, Words “Which by Their Very Utterance Inflict Injury”: The Evolving
Treatment of Inherently Dangerous Speech in Free Speech Law and Theory, 36 PEPP. L. REV. 317, 357
(2009).
68. Id.
69. City of Billings v. Nelson, 2014 MT 98, ¶ 23–28, 374 Mont. 444, 322 P.3d 1039.
70. Taylor v. Metzger, 706 A.2d 685, 691 (N.J. 1998) (quoting Charles R. Lawrence III, If He
Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech on Campus, 1990 DUKE L.J. 431, 452 (1990)).
71. Billings, 2014 MT 98 at ¶ 23–28 (citation omitted).
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Yet, if the first citation is to be believed, a racial slur works instantaneous
injury, separate from any tendency it has to provoke a violent reaction.
Even if someone were entirely unable to respond violently—for instance, if
confined or disabled by her tormentor—the slur would still do injury. The
same is true for In re J.K.P., a recent Kansas case examining a disorderly
conduct conviction for use of a slur, which discusses “evidence that the
word tends to inflict injury by its very utterance,” and goes on to ultimately
hold that “there was sufficient evidence for the district court to find that
J.K.P. knew or should have known that” his use of a racial slur “would
alarm, anger, or disturb them or provoke an assault or other breach of the
peace.”72 J.K.P. seems to hold that language known to alarm, anger, or
disturb others can be punishable in itself, even if it does not tend to provoke
a breach of the peace. The possibility that certain words, used in certain
circumstances, could be punishable in themselves was raised again recently
in Snyder v. Phelps, in which Justice Breyer’s concurrence stated, citing
Chaplinsky, that “in some circumstances the use of certain words as means
would be . . . unprotected.”73
Cases like EPILEPSY and PACEMAKER put clear pressure on the “sticksand-stones” position that has gained increasing popularity. Even if later
cases cabin the “inflict injury” language of Chaplinsky to exclude
punishment for speech that causes offense, emotional injury, or affront,
scholars and courts who regard that language as entirely irrelevant seem to
commit themselves to also protecting those who, via the communication of
information, cause injuries of the kind found in EPILEPSY and
PACEMAKER—particularly since such injuries also disable their victim
from responding with violence.74 Further, they call into question the doubts
we may have about allowing recovery in BULLYING or about permitting the
restraint on speech in TRIGGER WARNING—to the extent we can be certain
that such speech causes injury, we have good reason to abandon a
categorical presumption against punishing or prohibiting it.
C. Infliction of Emotional Distress
Both EPILEPSY and PACEMAKER involve scenarios where the victims
have unusual, preexisting frailties. In most cases of injury, the “eggshell
plaintiff” rule subjects tortfeasors to liability for the full extent of the
victim’s injuries, even where the victim had unusual and unforeseeable
frailties. The most recent Restatement of Torts likewise does not restrict

72. In re J.K.P., 296 P.3d 1140 (Kan. Ct. App. 2013).
73. Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 447 (2011) (Breyer, J., concurring).
74. Cf. State v. Dugan, 2013 MT 38, ¶ 43–45, 369 Mont. 39, 303 P.3d 755.
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liability in cases where victims suffer harm because of their psychological
or emotional frailties:
Reflecting the recent broadening of this principle in many
jurisdictions, the Restatement (Third) of Torts . . . expands the rule
to encompass (1) not only preexisting physical conditions but also
mental conditions and “other characteristics” of the victim, and (2)
not only those injuries that are greater than could be foreseen, but
also those that are “of a different type” than could be foreseen.75
Outside of the Restatement, however, there has been extensive debate about
whether and how the eggshell plaintiff rule should be extended to harms
such as the informational harms I discuss:
•
•

•

Two courts have held that the eggshell plaintiff rule does not
apply at all outside the context of “physical injuries.”76
Courts in Maine and North Carolina limit liability to cases
where “the harm” in question “reasonably could have been
expected to befall the ordinarily sensitive person.”77 But where
the defendant’s conduct would have harmed an ordinary
person, the defendant is fully liable for all consequences of his
conduct, even those attributable to his victim’s frailty.78
Massachusetts and New Jersey hold defendants liable for the
distress an ordinary person would experience, rather than the
victim’s actual experienced distress.79

75. Mary LaFrance, The Disappearing Fourth Wall: Law, Ethics, and Experiential Theatre, 15
VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 507, 540 (2013).
76. Ragin v. Harry Macklowe Real Estate Co., 6 F.3d 898, 908 (2d Cir. 1993); Munn v. Algee,
924 F.2d 568, 576 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 900 (1991).
77. Theriault v. Swan, 558 A.2d 369, 372 (Me. 1989) (“When the harm reasonably could affect
only the hurt feelings of the supersensitive plaintiff—the eggshell psyche—there is no entitlement to
recovery.”).
78. Id. (“If, however, the harm reasonably could have been expected to befall the ordinarily
sensitive person, the tortfeasor must take his victim as he finds her, extraordinarily sensitive or not.”);
Poole v. Copland, Inc., 498 S.E.2d 602, 604–05 (N.C. 1998) (“[I]n deciding whether the plaintiff’s
injury was a foreseeable consequence of the defendant Haynes’ wrongful actions, you must determine
whether such wrongful actions under the same or similar circumstances could reasonably have been
expected to injure a person of ordinary mental condition. If so, the harmful consequences from the
defendant’s wrongful acts would be reasonably foreseeable and therefore would be a proximate cause
of plaintiff’s injury. Under such circumstances the defendant would be liable for all the harmful
consequences which occur even though these harmful consequences may be unusually extensive
because of the peculiar or abnormal mental condition which happened to be present in the plaintiff.”).
79. DiMare v. RealtyTrac, Inc., 714 F. Supp. 2d 199, 211 (D. Mass. 2010) (“To recover for
negligent infliction of emotional distress, plaintiff must show that a reasonable person would have
suffered the same level of emotional distress under similar circumstances.”); Payton v. Abbott Labs,
437 N.E.2d 171, 181 (Mass. 1982) (“[U]nless a plaintiff proves that the defendant knew or should have
known of special factors affecting that plaintiff’s response to the circumstances of the case, the plaintiff
can recover only for that degree of emotional distress which a reasonable person, normally constituted,
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Still other courts apply the eggshell plaintiff rule across the
board, holding defendants fully liable even in cases where an
ordinary person would not have suffered harm.80 Similarly, if a
defendant aggravates an underlying psychological vulnerability
and the resulting damages cannot be apportioned, the
defendant is liable for the entirety of the damages.

All applications of the eggshell plaintiff rule except the last entail a
distinction, which requires defense, between mind-dependent and mindindependent injuries. Almost all courts, however, do recognize the eggshell
plaintiff rule in cases where the defendant knows—or, in some cases,
should have known—about the victim’s unusual vulnerability.
The Maine rule faces the additional challenge that it might allow
defendants to escape liability for injuries to vulnerable people even where
their conduct would have injured an ordinary person in a different way—
for instance, where the defendant’s conduct would have caused an ordinary
person to react angrily, but causes a vulnerable person to suffer an
emotional breakdown. Since an ordinary person would not have suffered
the alleged harm (the emotional breakdown), defendants might escape
liability, just as they would in cases where their conduct unforeseeably fails
to cause harm (“thick-skulled” cases). The vulnerable person is thickskulled with respect to the ordinarily predictable harm, but is thin-skulled
with respect to the actual harm that occurs. Meanwhile, where a
defendant’s conduct would cause an ordinary person to suffer an emotional
breakdown but would cause a vulnerable person to suffer a much more
severe breakdown, the Maine rule is unclear—if we regard the more severe
breakdown as a different harm, the defendant escapes liability, but if we
regard it as a more severe effect of the same harm, the defendant is fully
liable.
Beyond the eggshell plaintiff issue, many jurisdictions treat infliction
of emotional distress as a generally “disfavored” tort, only to be pled when
no other theory of recovery will be effective. The arguments for
disfavoring these torts are various, but frequently rely on the risk that
plaintiffs will malinger or that the emotional distress in question cannot be
quantified or made publicly visible. In response, several commentators
have complained that the disfavoring of emotional distress torts represents
would have experienced under those circumstances.”); Williamson v. Waldman, 696 A.2d 14, 22 (N.J.
1997) (“[W]e hold that a person claiming damages for emotional distress based on the fear that she has
contracted HIV must demonstrate that the defendant’s negligence proximately caused her genuine and
substantial emotional distress that would be experienced by a reasonable person of ordinary experience
who has a level of knowledge that coincides with then-current, accurate, and generally available public
information about the causes and transmission of AIDS.”)
80. Nickerson v. Hodges, 84 So. 37, 39 (La. 1920); Wilkinson v. Downton, [1897] 2 Q.B. 57
(Eng.).
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an unjustified bias that is particularly disadvantageous to female
plaintiffs.81 Our increasing ability to identify the underlying neural
correlates of harms caused by cruel or negative speech and conduct, as in
BULLYING, may remove what I’ll describe in Part III as the “epistemic”
argument against recognizing emotional distress torts—which relies on the
risk of malingering and the difficulty of measurement—and require the
advancement of a substantive argument that makes the case that emotional
distress is simply less important for society to prevent.
D. Statutory Law
A variety of statutes do not provide recovery for mind-dependent
injuries in cases like BULLYING:
•
•
•
•

Many statutes defining domestic abuse exclude injuries that are
emotional in nature.82
Some states’ workers’ compensation statutes do not allow
recovery for emotional injuries.83
The Internal Revenue Code taxes damages for non-physical
injury, but not damages for physical injury.84
The Prison Litigation Reform Act prohibits prisoners from
suing for emotional injury without being able to show physical
injury or sexual misconduct.85

Various justifications have been offered for these statutory limitations.
Among the most prominent are the subjectivity involved in individuals’

81. E.g., Lucinda M. Finley, A Break in the Silence: Including Women’s Issues in A Torts
Course, 1 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 41 (1989); Deborah K. Hepler, Providing Creative Remedies to
Bystander Emotional Distress Victims: A Feminist Perspective, 14 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 71 (1993);
Fernanda G. Nicola, Intimate Liability: Emotional Harm, Family Law, and Stereotyped Narratives in
Interspousal Torts, 19 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 445 (2013).
82. See Joy M. Bingham, Protecting Victims by Working Around the System and Within the
System: Statutory Protection for Emotional Abuse in the Domestic Violence Context, 81 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 837, 839–40 & n.14 (2005) (classifying statutes).
83. See Marc A. Antonetti, Labor Law: Workers’ Compensation Statutes and the Recovery of
Emotional Distress Damages in the Absence of Physical Injury, 1990 NYU ANN. SURV. AM. L. 671,
671–72 (1992) (“Recently, workers have begun to seek compensation for mental and emotional injuries
caused in the workplace without being accompanied by physical injury. Neither workers’ compensation
statutes nor tort law traditionally allowed for recovery of emotional distress damages in such cases.”);
Martha S. Davis, Rape in the Workplace, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 411, 424 (1996) (noting that a
“substantial minority of jurisdictions . . . have not recognized or been willing to compensate purely
mental and emotional injuries” as part of their workers’ compensation scheme).
84. 26 U.S.C § 104(a)(2) (2012).
85. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e (2012) (“No Federal civil action may be brought by a prisoner confined in
a jail, prison, or other correctional facility, for mental or emotional injury suffered while in custody
without a prior showing of physical injury or the commission of a sexual act . . . .”).
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psychological reactions to conduct, as well as concerns about
malingering.86
Investigating the legislative history of these and other statutory
provisions is often revealing. During 2000, there was a bipartisan effort to
eliminate taxation on emotional distress awards, rendering them parallel to
physical injury awards. Sen. Charles Robb (D-VA) argued that the existing
tax regime is unfair: “damages received for emotional distress in civil
rights cases are taxable, while those received in slip and fall accidents are
not. There is no defensible reason for this disparity and it must be
changed.”87 Sen. Charles Grassley (R-IA) made parallel remarks.88 In
contrast, several members of Congress have spoken in favor of
differentiating emotional distress damages from damages for mindindependent injuries.89 A similar debate took place surrounding the Prison
Litigation Reform Act, with some commentators arguing that the Act
should have included relief for mind-dependent injuries.90 We also see
similar discussions when liability and damage provisions in other federal
statutes come up for debate, such as a proposal to amend the Interstate
Commerce Commission Sunset Act to preempt state and federal laws that

86. Antonetti, supra note 83, at 672.
87. 146 CONG. REC. S7160-03 (daily ed. July 18, 2000) (statement of Sen. Robb), 2000 WL
986303. This inclusion had previously been rejected: in 1996, Senator Carole Moseley-Braun (D-IL)
stated that
I regret the deletion by the conference committee of safeguards against the taxation of nonphysical compensatory damages. That provision is inequitable because it makes a distinction
between physical and non-physical compensatory damages. Under this bill, victims of sex
discrimination, race discrimination, and emotional distress would be required to pay taxes on
any damages they receive while, on the other hand, victims of battery will not be taxed. Not
only is this provision bad tax policy but it is discriminatory, and will make it more difficult
for victims of these crimes to achieve justice.
142 CONG. REC. S9541-01 (daily ed. Aug. 2, 1996), 1996 WL 438355.
88. 146 CONG. REC. S7160-03 (daily ed. July, 18, 2000) (statement of Sen. Grassley), 2000 WL
98603.
89. E.g., 141 CONG. REC. S6068-02 (daily ed. May 3, 1995) (statement of Sen. Abraham), 1995
WL 255991 (“Noneconomic damages are awarded to compensate plaintiffs for subjective harm, like
pain and suffering, emotional distress, and humiliation. Since noneconomic damages are not based on
tangible losses, however, there are no objective criteria for calculating their amount. As a result, the size
of these awards often depends more on the luck of the draw, in terms of the jury, than on the rule of
law.”); 140 CONG. REC. H7274-01 (daily ed. H7274-01) (statement of Congressman Horn), 1994 WL
416899 (“[T]hese are caps on payments for emotional distress, they are not compensation for actual and
real harm suffered.”).
90. E.g., Prison Abuse Remedies: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and
Homeland Security of the H. Comm on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. (2008) (statement of Ernie Preate,
Jr., attorney), 2008 WL 1815202 (criticizing the PLRA’s “physical injury” requirement); Prison
Litigation Reform Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security of
the H. Comm on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. (2007) (statement of Margo Schlanger, Professor of Law,
Washington Univ. in St. Louis), 2007 WL 3349768 (criticizing “the PLRA’s ban on awards of
compensatory damages for ‘mental or emotional injury suffered while in custody without a prior
showing of physical injury’”).
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provide damages for mind-dependent injury;91 the inclusion of provisions
limiting the liability of foreign cruise ships for mind-dependent injury to
passengers in a Coast Guard authorization bill;92 the imposition of caps on
damages for mind-dependent injury as part of a medical malpractice tort
reform bill;93 the amendment of the Privacy Act to allow for damages for
mind-dependent injury;94 and the inclusion of such damages in a litigation
reform proposal advanced in response to the “Y2K” glitch.95
III. NORMATIVE DIRECTIONS
How should we resolve the pressure that new species of injury put on
tort law? Some argue in favor of preserving the existing distinction
between mind-dependent and mind-independent injuries. These arguments
generally rely on one of two strategies. What I call epistemic
preservationism argues for a distinction grounded in the practical difficulty
91. 141 CONG. REC. S17593-01 (daily ed. Nov. 28, 1995) (statement of Sen. Ashcroft), 1995 WL
699382 (“You cannot recover emotional harm or pain and suffering because of the anguish of learning
that your Aunt Millie’s vase was crushed in the shipment. You can only get the value of the vase. So,
the carrier is protected from having to pay some very subjective damages . . . .”); see also Household
Goods Moving Industry: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Transp. and Infrastructure, 107th Cong.
(2001) (statement of Joseph M. Harrison, President, Am. Moving and Storage Assn.), 2001 WL 800488
(“The fact that Mrs. Jones sustained emotional stress because of damage to a cherished piece of
furniture is akin to the shop owner who sustains emotional stress because merchandise was not
delivered in time for an announced sale. Wisely, Congress and the courts have rejected claims for
damages predicated upon these scenarios.”).
92. 141 CONG. REC. S17362-01 (daily ed. Nov. 17, 1995) (statement of Sen. Kerry) (“The first
provision would allow foreign cruise ship owners to use the fine print on the back of tickets to deny
liability for emotional distress claims brought by passengers, unless the passengers also suffered
substantial physical injuries. A number of women’s groups and organizations across the country,
including the Women’s Legal Defense Fund, the Women’s Law Center, and the NOW Legal Defense
Fund, have expressed strong opposition to this provision. They are rightfully concerned that it could
make it more difficult for victims of rape on foreign-flag cruise vessels, who suffer tremendous
emotional scars but sometimes only minor physical injuries, to bring civil lawsuits against the cruise
lines that bear responsibility for their trauma.”).
93. Compare 151 CONG. REC. H6974-03 (daily ed. Jul. 28, 2005) (statement of Congressman
Smith), 2005 WL 1788540 (arguing for caps on pain and suffering damages, and arguing that
“[b]etween two-thirds and three-quarters of the American people support exactly what we are trying to
do”), with id. (statement of Congressman Larson) (contending that the proposed cap would “punish
victims of malpractice and cause significant inequalities in compensation for women, children, seniors,
and lower-income workers”).
94. 158 CONG. REC. S5904-02 (daily ed. Aug. 3, 2012) (statement of Sen. Akaka), 2012 WL
3136303 (“The Court concluded that the plaintiff could not recover damages for emotional
distress . . . . My amendment would heed the call of scholars across the political spectrum to amend the
Privacy Act and fix this decision.”).
95. Year 2000 Computer Problems, Lawsuits and Liability: Hearing on H.R. 775 Before the H.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. (1999) (statement of Sally Greenberg, Senior Prod. Safety
Counsel, Consumers Union), 1999 WL 216365 (“While we are pleased that personal injury cases are
outside the scope of this legislation, we are concerned that damages for mental suffering, emotional
distress and other non-physical injuries appear to be precluded. For example, it appears that a claim for
mental suffering or emotional distress brought by someone whose positive HIV status or cancer is made
public due to a Y2K glitch might be severely limited or barred.”).
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of determining conclusively that an individual has suffered a minddependent injury. In contrast, what I call moral preservationism argues for
a distinction based on a moral difference between mind-dependent and
mind-independent injuries. A third view, metaphysical preservationism,
which has not been defended in the literature but I believe forms a tacit
basis for many defenses of the distinction, rests the distinction on the
adoption of a metaphysics that regards the mind and body as different
categories of stuff.
Others argue for what I will call assimilationism: on this approach, our
treatment of mind-dependent injuries in the law should become no different
from our current treatment of the existing category of mind-independent
injuries, without reconsidering our treatment of the latter.
I will defend a third approach, which I call the disintegration approach.
Rather than treating mind-dependent or mind-independent injuries as a
monolithic category, the disintegration approach regards changes in our
understanding of mind-dependent injuries as an opportunity to rethink our
legal treatment of both. In particular, it suggests a more nuanced and
granular approach to the legal treatment of injury, which considers and
differentiates the underlying interests that are affected by different types of
injuries, whether those injuries be mind-dependent or mind-independent.
A. Preservation
1. Epistemic
Epistemic (i.e., knowledge-based) preservationism relies on concerns
about whether courts can reliably know that someone has experienced an
injury. One species of epistemic preservation appeals to doubts about the
severity of the injury itself. The Massachusetts Supreme Court effectively
summarizes this version of preservationism in its dismissal of an emotional
distress claim: “in the absence of the guarantee of genuineness provided by
resulting bodily harm . . . emotional disturbance can be too easily feigned
or imagined.”96 This claim has two parts: first, it assumes that identifiable
bodily harm guarantees the “genuineness” of an injury, and, second, it
asserts that emotional disturbance does not similarly guarantee

96. Payton v. Abbott Labs, 437 N.E.2d 171, 178 (Mass. 1982); see also Gardner v. Cumberland
Tel. Co., 268 S.W. 1108, 1110 (Ky. 1925) (asserting that emotional distress is “‘easily simulated and
hard to disprove’” (quoting Reed v. Ford, 112 S.W. 600, 600 (Ky. Ct. App. 1908))); Bosley v. Andrews,
142 A.2d 263, 267 (Pa. 1958) (“For every wholly genuine and deserving claim, there would likely be a
tremendous number of illusory or imaginative or ‘faked’ ones.”).
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genuineness. Scholarly commentary has similarly discussed concerns about
plaintiffs who malinger or pretend injuries.97
Another species of epistemic preservationism involves doubts about
causation: this argument makes that case that, even when we are certain
that an injury has happened, we frequently cannot perceive its cause. We
see this form of preservationism in the Massachusetts Supreme Court’s
decision discussed supra,98 as well as in several decisions discussing the
“impact rule,” which barred recovery for emotional distress unaccompanied
by visible physical injury.99 Some commentators have noted the difficulty
of proving causation in cases involving the “emotional distress” tort, and
have surmised that concerns about proving causation (as well as, or instead
of, concerns about the provability of emotional injury itself) may support
the deprecation of claims for emotional distress.100
Epistemic preservationism has been questioned from its inception, as
many courts and judges have identified contexts where mind-dependent
harms are clearly identifiable and attributable.101 And, relevantly for our
purposes, it has been called into further question by advances in
neuroscience and in the behavioral sciences more generally. Behavioral
scientists have developed better tests to identify malingering, and are
developing the capacity to directly identify neural traces of pain and other
effects of injury. As Adam Kolber argues,
For a long time, psychologists, psychiatrists, and social workers
have provided expert testimony about litigants’ emotional distress,
including their experiences of panic, depression, and anxiety. One
way these experts make assessments of subjective experience is by
obtaining litigants’ self-reports. But in forensic contexts, litigants
97. E.g., John J. Kircher, The Four Faces of Tort Law: Liability for Emotional Harm, 90 MARQ.
L. REV. 789, 838 (2007) (identifying “concern over the genuineness of the emotional distress claim”);
Deirdre M. Smith, Diagnosing Liability: The Legal History of Posttraumatic Stress Disorder, 84 TEMP.
L. REV. 1, 18 (2011) (noting “concerns about malingering or exaggeration and the great difficulty in
quantifying emotional distress”).
98. Payton, 437 N.E.2d at 184 (“[W]e have relied in part on the difficulty of proving causation
and the existence and extent of purely emotional distress as a reason for denying recovery of damages
for emotional distress in the absence of some objective evidence of physical harm.”); Carrillo v. Boise
Tire Co., 274 P.3d 1256, 1265 (Idaho 2012); Toney v. Chester Cnty. Hosp., 36 A.3d 83, 90 (Pa. 2011)
(noting that “our Court has limited recovery for emotional distress due to the difficulty of proving its
causation”); cf. Duncan v. United States, 667 F.2d 36, 48 n.23 (Ct. Cl. 1981) (discussing the “practical
difficulties of assessing causation” where a breach of trust was alleged).
99. Hughes v. Moore, 197 S.E.2d 214, 218 (Va. 1973) (discussing “medical science’s difficulty
in proving causation between the claimed damages and the alleged fright”).
100. See, e.g., Ellen L. Luepke, Note, HIV Misdiagnosis: Negligent Infliction of Emotional
Distress and the False-Positive, 81 IOWA L. REV. 1229, 1232 (1996).
101. E.g., Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912, 917 (Cal. 1968) (rejecting argument that emotional
distress claims are so likely to be fraudulent that recovery should not be permitted); Harrison v. Loyal
Protective Life Ins. Co., 396 N.E.2d 987, 991 (Mass. 1979) (“As for the proof of the defendant’s actions
or words, an emotional distress case is no different from a case of battery or contract . . . .”).
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have incentives to lie, and we are disinclined to trust their claims.
While mental health professionals have some methods of detecting
malingering, in the experiential future, they will have far better
methods of diagnosing psychiatric symptoms and estimating their
severity, even when subjects have incentives to lie.102
In a recent article, Betsy Grey has similarly detailed the ways in which new
scientific findings regarding emotional distress injuries challenge existing
arguments for distinguishing mind-dependent from mind-independent
harms. Grey suggests that ultimately, neuroscience and other scientific
advances will undermine the epistemic preservationist argument: “Psychic
injury should no longer raise the concerns it once did of fraud or lack of
predictability.”103
While advances in neuroscience and the behavioral sciences can help to
call the epistemic justification for preservationism into doubt, they cannot,
on their own, show that preservationism is mistaken.104 Even if clear
scientific evidence shows that someone has suffered a particular
consequence—for instance, that the conduct in BULLYING has led to
identifiable changes in the victim’s brain that have negative consequences
for her—the normative significance of those changes can still be called into
doubt. For instance, some might doubt that the changes are of moral
significance. Others might assert that they are not the putative tortfeasor’s
moral or legal responsibility, therefore nullifying the case for fault-based
compensation. I turn to these morally-based, rather than epistemicallybased, preservationist arguments next.
2. Moral
The moral-preservation argument contends that, even if undisputed
examples of mind-dependent injury can be identified, such injuries are
morally less deserving of compensation. This argument, like the epistemic
preservation argument, comes in at least two flavors. One supports the idea
that the injury itself is a diminished one: it makes the case that minddependent injuries are inherently less hurtful than mind-independent ones.
The second holds out that, regardless of the severity of the injury, liability
102. Adam J. Kolber, The Experiential Future of the Law, 60 EMORY L.J. 585, 617–18 (2011)
(footnote omitted).
103. Betsy J. Grey, Neuroscience and Emotional Harm in Tort Law: Rethinking the American
Approach to Free-Standing Emotional Distress Claims, in 13 LAW AND NEUROSCIENCE: CURRENT
LEGAL ISSUES 225 (Michael Freeman ed. 2011).
104. Grey concedes as much. See id. at 229 (“If there is to be no or lesser recovery for mental
distress claims, then this choice should be better explained by policy concerns about ruinous liability
and a desire to reserve funds for victims of other harms rather than based on an unexamined mentalphysical boundary.”).
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for mind-dependent injuries should be less than for mind-independent
injuries.
I will examine the moral-preservation argument by engaging with one
of its most recent exemplars, a proposal by Erica Goldberg. After
reviewing and cogently rejecting some epistemic-preservationist
arguments, as well as some of the arguments for assimilation that I discuss
below, Goldberg argues that a distinction between physical and emotional
harm “can be justified by reference to a duty that we owe to take care of
ourselves, which in turn limits the duties others owe to avoid distressing
us.”105
The central question for a moral-preservation theory like Goldberg’s is
what justifies a duty to take care of ourselves emotionally that exceeds our
duty to take care of ourselves physically. After all, if I suffer a broken arm
because of a falling bag of flour, I am capable of taking care of myself: I
can seek medical care, get my arm stabilized in a cast, and ensure that I do
not engage in activity that is likely to lengthen the healing process.
Furthermore, I am also capable of taking precautions to avoid the broken
arm in the first place—for instance, by strengthening my bones and by
avoiding areas where objects are likely to fall. Yet we allow me to recover
even if I am avoidably physically weak.106
Goldberg offers several possible justifications for a distinctive duty to
pay the costs of dealing with emotional harms that one suffers. One
justification she offers is the efficient promotion of welfare. She argues that
when an action causes physical injury, there are reasons to think
that it is more likely to be socially inappropriate or harmful than an
action that causes emotional harm. An action that causes physical
injury is less likely to have positive consequences, and it is more
likely that the perpetrator could have reaped many of the action’s
benefits without causing harm by taking more precautionary
measures. It is also more likely that the defendant can properly
account for all the harms and benefits that result from her behavior
when making rational calculations about whether to engage in the
behavior.107
However, the reasons Goldberg identifies for regarding the broad category
of “actions causing emotional injuries” as more likely to be socially
productive than actions causing physical injuries are not persuasive. In
many cases—for example, those involving the use of racist or sexist
105. Erica Goldberg, Emotional Duties, 47 CONN. L. REV. 809, 842 (2015).
106. E.g., Doty v. Sewall, 908 F.2d 1053, 1059 (1st Cir. 1990) (“In personal injury law, it is well
settled that in an action for damages, the tortfeasor ‘takes his victim as he finds him.’”).
107. Goldberg, supra note 105, at 854 (footnote omitted).
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slurs—it is easy to foresee that an action will cause emotional harm, and
difficult to see what social benefit such slurs advance.108 Meanwhile, there
are many actions, such as the provision of vaccinations, that predictably
cause some physical injuries but engender major social benefits.109 As I
will argue in the final subpart of this Article, we would do better to move
away from a dichotomy between mind-dependent and mind-independent
injuries, and toward a more fine-grained differentiation of injury types.
A different justification offered by Goldberg appeals to the claim that
emotional harms are attributable to the harmed individual, rather than the
putative cause of harm. Goldberg argues for this as follows:
I control the use of my body, and any actions to which I did not
consent and that injure my body violate that right and impose upon
my ability to make decisions about my body. However, in the case
of emotional injury, someone’s wrongful action may have caused
me to suffer emotional upset, but, in most cases, my mind was not
invaded by that person’s actions and my free will was not
disrupted. The harms are therefore attributable to me.110
Goldberg does not specify what it means for someone’s mind to be
invaded, nor her free will disrupted. While psychology and neuroscience
cannot provide us with ultimate moral truths, they can provide us with
strong and compelling evidence regarding attributability. Though historical
concerns about subliminal messages have largely proven meritless, recent
research in the brain sciences shows that one person’s presenting
information to another frequently can have direct impacts on the latter
individual’s mind that is not mediated by her own judgments.111 John
Greenman has questioned whether such transmission of information or
content constitutes “communication” at all, as opposed to conduct that
imposes burdens on others.112 Further, even if someone can take measures
to protect her mind from being affected in these ways, Goldberg has not
offered us a reason to believe that she has a moral duty to so protect herself
that differs from her duty to protect herself from physical injury in the ways
108. See Susan Brison, Speech, Harm, and the Mind-Body Problem in First Amendment
Jurisprudence, 4 LEGAL THEORY 39, 47–57 (1998); Lawrence, supra note 70, at 452.
109. See Bruesewitz v. Wyeth LLC, 562 U.S. 223, 228 (2011).
110. Goldberg, supra note 105, at 858 (footnote omitted).
111. See, e.g., Daniel T. Gilbert et al., You Can’t Not Believe Everything You Read, 65 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 221, 222, 230–32 (questioning whether people are “capable of the
skepticism that good science and free speech apparently require,” and providing evidence that
“information changes people even when they do not wish to be changed”). See generally Jeremy N.
Sheff, The Myth of the Level Playing Field: Knowledge, Affect, and Repetition in Public Debate, 75
MO. L. REV. 143, 160–61 (2010) (summarizing evidence from the behavioral sciences regarding the
effect of mere exposure and repetition on listeners).
112. John Greenman, On Communication, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1337, 1350 (2008).
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with which we are familiar—avoiding unsafe paths, paying attention to her
surroundings, ensuring that her body is in good working order.
Moreover, going beyond Goldberg’s discussion, it is unclear why we
should conclude that mind-dependent harms are always attributable to the
injured individual while mind-independent harms are attributable to some
other party. Judith Jarvis Thomson has attempted to argue as much,
however, in her work on rights. Thomson argues that individuals do not
have a right against being subject to “belief-mediated distress,” where
belief-mediated distress results from conduct whose injurious nature is
dependent on one’s beliefs and would not be injurious but for those
beliefs.113 An insult is a paradigm case of conduct that causes beliefmediated distress. Thomson asserts—like Goldberg—that people have
“some responsibility” for their beliefs, even if those beliefs (for instance,
that ethnic slurs should not be used) are entirely reasonable ones.114
Additionally, she argues that compensation for belief-mediated distress is
unfair to individuals who have cultivated such equanimity that they are not
injured by insults or similar conduct.115
Alan Wertheimer provides several compelling reasons to reject a view
like Thomson’s. Wertheimer points out that the argument that individuals
bear some responsibility for minimizing the belief-mediated injury they
suffer from others’ conduct seems applicable to non-belief-mediated
distress as well, and that it can sometimes be easier to protect oneself
against the latter than the former.116 Further, Wertheimer observes that
“even if [someone] can reduce her level of distress, it does not follow that
the burden of such reduction should fall on” the injured rather than the
injurer.117 Here, Wertheimer is restating a classic point due to Ronald
Coase: any injury is attributable, in a formal sense, to both the injured party
and the injurer, and who should bear the burden of avoiding the injury is a
normative rather than causal question.118
In a recent article, Andrew Cornford provides a further basis for
rejecting the sort of categorical distinction Thomson and Goldberg defend.
Cornford notes several “respects in which negative feelings differ
materially from physical pains,” notably the fact that “we exercise a degree
113. JUDITH JARVIS THOMSON, THE REALM OF RIGHTS 250–54 (1990).
114. Id. at 253.
115. Id. at 255.
116. ALAN WERTHEIMER, CONSENT TO SEXUAL RELATIONS 99 (2003) (“An airline baggage
handler can avoid the non-belief-mediated distress of loud noise by wearing ear plugs, but it may be
difficult to steel oneself against one’s belief-mediated fear of Doberman pinschers or anger at an ethnic
slur.”); see also Anthony Ellis, Thomson on Distress, 106 ETHICS 112, 114 (1995) (noting that “how
much pain I suffer if you punch me in the stomach is very significantly a function of my own actions”);
Brison, supra note 108, at 55–58.
117. WERTHEIMER, supra note 116, at 99.
118. Cf. MICHAEL MOORE, CAUSATION AND RESPONSIBILITY 94 (2010).
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of control over our mental states that we do not typically exercise over
sensations of other kinds.”119 However, Cornford goes on to reject the view
that mental injuries are less morally significant than physical ones because
they are attributable to the injured party rather than the injurer:
Since we exercise a degree of control over our beliefs, we also
have a degree of control over whether or not we suffer beliefmediated negative feelings. One might therefore think that we are
to an extent morally responsible for the occurrence of such
feelings, even when they are prompted by the actions of others.
Once again, though, it is difficult to believe that we do not have
duties to cause belief-mediated negative feelings simply because
we exercise some degree of control over them. . . . Rather, the
uniquely problematic aspect of belief-mediation does not become
apparent until we consider cases in which the relevant beliefs are
unreasonable.120
Cornford’s point is that we are entitled not only to legal protection against
conduct whose injurious nature depends on our immutable properties as
individuals (e.g., that we are vulnerable to extreme cold and heat), but also
to protection against conduct whose injurious nature derives from nonimmutable aspects of ourselves that are nonetheless morally legitimate
(e.g., that we are upset by racial slurs).121 The move from an immutability
to a legitimacy argument in favor of legal protection is familiar from other
contexts, most notably antidiscrimination law. Rather than arguing that
individuals should be protected from discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation or religion because these characteristics are immutable, scholars
have moved toward arguing that these characteristics are ones that, as
Andrew Koppelman puts it, “the state has no legitimate interest in
influencing.”122
Ultimately, the danger of the moral preservationist approach is that it
maintains the structure of prior precedent even after the underlying
justification for that precedent has disappeared. The philosopher and
psychologist Joshua Greene, for instance, has advanced this as a criticism

119. Andrew Cornford, Criminalising Anti-Social Behavior, 6 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 1, 6 (2012).
120. Id.
121. See also WERTHEIMER, supra note 116, at 100 (arguing that legal regulation should turn on
whether beliefs are legitimate or illegitimate, rather than merely whether distress is or is not beliefmediated).
122. Andrew Koppelman, Why Discrimination Against Lesbians and Gay Men Is Sex
Discrimination, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 197, 203 (1994). See generally Edward Stein, Immutability and
Innateness Arguments About Lesbian, Gay, and Bisexual Rights, 89 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 597, 616
(2014).
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of Kantian morality;123 the political theorist Alasdair MacIntyre has
similarly argued that Enlightenment and post-Enlightenment ethical theory
attempts to retain the structure of traditional ethics, but without the
underlying religious and metaphysical commitments that make that
tradition compelling.124 Similarly, the moral preservationist approach
strives to retain the traditional distinction between mind-dependent and
mind-independent injuries, but frequently lacks a compelling basis for that
distinction.
3. Metaphysical
This argument straightforwardly asserts that mind-dependent and
mind-independent injuries belong to different ontological categories. It
relies on a sort of mind-body dualism, in which mind is treated as an
entirely nonphysical substance. That some preservationist arguments are
grounded in dualism should not be surprising. As a matter of history, mindbody dualism was the predominant view in the West during much of the
time in which the legal doctrine classifying different types of harm was
developing.125 Perhaps the most prominent defender of a dualist view was
Descartes, who postulated that mind and body are comprised of
ontologically different substances.126
Some courts have astutely identified a dualist metaphysics underlying
legal precedent that differentiates bodily from mental injury. The New
York Court of Appeals did so in a seminal 1974 case:
[I]n its ordinary usage, the term “bodily” suggests opposition to
“mental”. This traditional dualism may or may not reflect the
actual physiological structure of the human organism; it may be
that fright and emotional distress are as much “bodily”, in the sense
of “physiological”, as a broken leg. But the relationship between
“mind” and “body”—a stubborn problem in human thought—is not
the question before us nor one we would presume to decide.
Rather, in seeking to apply the treaty’s terms to the facts before us,
123. JOSHUA D. GREENE, The Secret Joke of Kant’s Soul, in MORAL PSYCHOLOGY: THE
NEUROSCIENCE OF MORALITY: EMOTION, BRAIN DISORDERS, AND DEVELOPMENT 35, 61–66 (Walter
Sinnott-Armstrong ed., 2008).
124. ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE ch. 5 (3d ed. 2011).
125. Cf. Ware ex rel. Ware v. ANW Special Educ. Coop. No. 603, 180 P.3d 610, 621–22 (Kan.
Ct. App. 2008) (Greene, J., dissenting) (“Whatever the best minds of the day might have thought about
the difference in physical and emotional harm when tort law came of age, the best minds of today do
not support such a stark mind-body dichotomy. Our current understanding rejects this Cartesian dualism
and leads us in the direction of an integrated model for understanding harm.” (quoting Daniel W.
Shuman, How We Should Address Mental and Emotional Harm, 90 JUDICATURE 248, 248–49 (2007))).
126. RENÉ DESCARTES, Meditations on First Philosophy, in 2 THE PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS OF
RENÉ DESCARTES 1–62 (J. Cottingham et al. trans., 1984).
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we ask whether the treaty’s use of the word “bodily”, in its
ordinary meaning, can fairly be said to include “mental”. We deal
with the term as used in an international agreement written almost
50 years ago, a term which even today would have little
significance in the treaty as an adjective modifying “injury” except
to import a distinction from “mental”. In our view, therefore, the
ordinary, natural meaning of “bodily injury” as used in article 17
connotes palpable, conspicuous physical injury, and excludes
mental injury with no observable “bodily”, as distinguished from
“behavioral”, manifestations.127
More recently, an opinion by the California Court of Appeals has identified
a dualist basis for the doctrinal distinction between emotional and physical
distress in the law of torts. In Lawson v. Management Activities, Inc.,128 the
court interpreted California tort jurisprudence, in particular a passage from
the California Supreme Court’s decision in Sloane v. Southern California
Railway Co.:
The interdependence of the mind and body is in many respects so
close that it is impossible to distinguish their respective influence
upon each other. It must be conceded that a nervous shock or
paroxysm, or a disturbance of the nervous system, is distinct from
mental anguish, and falls within the physiological, rather than the
psychological, branch of the human organism.129
The Lawson court identified the dualist underpinnings of the Sloane
decision:
The passage from Sloane, if read carefully, suggests that the
Supreme Court casually accepted an almost “Cartesian” view that
there is a mental world wholly divorced from the physical body,
but simply located the particular damages in the Sloane case on the
“body” side of the divide. Thus the implication was that if the
damages were really “mental” there would have been no
recovery.130
Several other cases similarly identified “damage to the nervous system” as
separate from purely emotional distress, regarding the nervous system as
physical and not mental.131
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

Rosman v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 314 N.E.2d 848, 855 (N.Y. 1974) (footnote omitted).
81 Cal. Rptr. 2d 745, 752–53 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999).
44 P. 320, 322 (Cal. 1896).
Lawson, 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d. at 752–53.
Id. at 664 (collecting cases).
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As a matter of intellectual history, it is not surprising that early tort law
precedents reflected Cartesian commitments. As a recent survey article
notes, Cartesian dualism did not lose its popularity until the twentieth
century, with the advent of behaviorism in the social sciences and Gilbert
Ryle’s 1949 critique in The Concept of Mind.132 Yet Cartesian dualism is
widely rejected today: the Cartesian view is broadly agreed to be incorrect,
even though there is little consensus on which theory of the mind-body
relationship should replace it.133
Despite the widespread rejection of dualism among academic experts,
many ordinary people may well continue to maintain some version of a
Cartesian dualist position. As Joshua Greene and Jonathan Cohen contend,
“Most people’s view of the mind is implicitly dualist . . . . Dualism, for our
purposes, is the view that mind and brain are separate, interacting,
entities. . . . Many people, particularly those who are religious, are
explicitly dualist. . . .”134 Greene and Cohen go on to examine two quotes
from criminal law scholars that suggest commitment to an underlying
dualism that differentiates brain from mind.135
The prominence of dualism during the development of tort doctrine
indicates that tort law’s underlying commitments regarding injuries
involving the mind may well reflect the influence of dualism. Further, to
the extent Greene and Cohen are correct that even educated scholars
frequently slip back into dualist thinking, we should expect to see dualist
commitments continue to play a role in modern jurisprudence. However,
dualism can no longer be regarded as a defensible basis for a distinction
between mind-dependent and mind-independent injuries.136 To the extent
such a categorical distinction is defensible, a straightforwardly moral
argument appears the only promising route.137

132. See Howard Robinson, Dualism § 1.2, THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY
(Edward N. Zalta ed., 2013), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2012/entries/dualism/; see also
WILLIAM G. LYCAN, CONSCIOUSNESS 1-3 (1995) (reviewing reasons for dualism’s loss of popularity
and dating its loss of popularity to the twentieth century); Rebecca Dresser, Culpability and Other
Minds, 2 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 41, 66 (1993) (similar).
133. See Shen, supra note 9, at 418–19 (collecting evidence).
134. Joshua Greene & Jonathan Cohen, For the Law, Neuroscience Changes Nothing and
Everything, 359 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC’Y LONDON B 1775, 1779 (2004).
135. Id.
136. Cf. Michael C. Dorf, Same-Sex Marriage, Second-Class Citizenship, and Law’s Social
Meanings, 97 VA. L. REV. 1267, 1279 (2011) (“[F]eelings are not literally intangible. They correspond
with physical states of the brain. Whether D punches P in the nose or calls P a hurtful name, P will
experience discomfort through a complicated sequence of neurochemistry. Emotional harm thus is
physical harm. Accordingly, to the extent that expressive theories of law aim to identify and provide
redress for the emotional pain that insults and other actions or statements can cause, they may best be
understood as simply striving to combat mind/body dualism.”).
137. Id. (observing that “[i]ssues of proof and floodgates concerns probably suffice to explain
tort law’s historical and ongoing wariness” concerning mind-dependent injuries).
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B. Assimilation
The assimilation argument simply argues that we should treat all types
of torts as we currently treat ordinary physical injuries. This argument has
been frequently advanced by courts and commentators.138 The Wyoming
Supreme Court effectively presents one version of the assimilation
argument, which attempts to rebut a variety of arguments in favor of a
distinction:
Any time a defendant must pay for his wrongs he is burdened. And
any time he passes that liability on to his insurer, as anticipated in
his contract with the insurer, the loss is felt by persons other than
the defendant. Insurance is a loss spreading device by design.
Increased insurance premiums are “unwarranted” only when we
decide that a loss should fall on the innocent victim rather than the
guilty tortfeasor, his insurer, and the public. Finally, the fact that
legal causation must terminate somewhere does not mean it must
terminate short of mental injuries.139
Other courts and judges have proffered similar arguments.140 And
neuroscientific evidence has been employed to give this argument
additional force.141
The primary problem with the assimilation argument is that it moves
too uncritically from the analogy between mind-dependent and mindindependent harm to the conclusion that mind-dependent harm should
simply be treated as mind-independent harm now is. As a formal matter,
such a parallelism equally suggests that mind-independent harm should be
assimilated to our current treatment of mind-dependent harm. More
generally, that the set of potentially tortious conduct is evolving suggests
reason to rethink and reconsider our legal treatment of that conduct, rather

138. E.g., Jean Macchiaroli Eggen & Eric J. Laury, Toward a Neuroscience Model of Tort Law:
How Functional Neuroimaging Will Transform Tort Doctrine, 13 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 235,
289 (2012) (“[T]he neuroscience model we propose would abandon the distinction between the
treatment of mental and physical disabilities upon the introduction of reliable and relevant neuroscience
evidence.”).
139. Gates v. Richardson, 719 P.2d 193, 197 (Wyo. 1986).
140. Ware ex rel. Ware v. ANW Special Educ. Coop. No. 603, 180 P.3d 610, 622 (Kan. Ct. App.
2008) (Greene, J., dissenting) (approvingly citing statement by commentator that “[t]oday and
tomorrow’s scientific paradigms do not support differential legal treatment of mental and physical
harm.”).
141. E.g., Allen v. Bloomfield Hills Sch. Dist., 760 N.W.2d 811, 816 (Mich. Ct. App. 2008)
(“[A]s a matter of medicine and law, there should be no difference medically or legally between an
objectively demonstrated brain injury, whether the medical diagnosis is a closed head injury, PTSD,
Alzheimer’s, brain tumor, epilepsy, etc. A brain injury is a ‘bodily injury.’”).
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than simply insisting that new torts fit into the same paradigm that we have
hitherto adopted.
In other contexts where a category evolves, the evolution of that
category has provided an opportunity to reconsider the proper status and
evaluation of that category, rather than simply allowing new members into
a fixed and unchanging institution. For instance, some have argued that
expanding the definition of marriage to include same-sex couples should
prompt us to reconsider the present gender norms and scripts that have
hitherto characterized marriage. In a recent article, Deborah Widiss
observes that “[t]ens of thousands of same-sex couples are now married,
and this reality offers the opportunity to rethink aspects of marriage law
more generally.”142 Widiss goes on to speculate that same-sex marriage
may allow us to differentiate the effects of gender norms from those of
substantive marriage law, and “that the advent of same-sex marriage also
invites reconsideration of the normative vision of equality within marriage.
Perhaps, rather than idealizing a marriage in which both spouses equally
share breadwinning and caregiving responsibilities, it is appropriate to
accept and expect a certain level of specialization in many marriages.”143 In
an earlier article, Nan Hunter similarly noted the potentially transformative
effect of same-sex marriage on marriage more generally, though her
speculation reached a different outcome: she concluded that legalizing
same-sex marriages could “destabilize the gendered definition of marriage
for everyone.”144 In particular—as Martha Nussbaum suggests in the
marriage context—the proposed inclusion of new members in a category
can prompt us to consider fragmenting that category into more finely
distinguished subcategories.145 I consider such a proposal in the next
subpart.
142. Deborah A. Widiss, Changing the Marriage Equation, 89 WASH. U. L. REV. 721, 729
(2012); see also Barbara A. Atwood, Marital Contracts and the Meaning of Marriage, 54 ARIZ. L. REV.
11, 40 (2012) (observing that “socioeconomic shifts between men and women and the emergence of
same-sex marriage invite us to rethink traditional limits placed on the contractual autonomy of
spouses”); Vanessa A. Lavely, Note, The Path to Recognition of Same-Sex Marriage: Reconciling the
Inconsistencies Between Marriage and Adoption Cases, 55 UCLA L. REV. 247, 252 (2007) (“The
legalization of same-sex marriage requires courts to undergo a two-step process: first acknowledging
the social fact of same-sex marriages, and then, in turn, rethinking whether the traditional legal
definition of marriage is still capable of protecting the rights of all citizens.”).
143. Widiss, supra note 142, at 794.
144. Nan D. Hunter, Marriage, Law, and Gender: A Feminist Inquiry, 1 LAW & SEXUALITY 9,
12 (1991); see also Ralph Richard Banks, Rights and Meanings: How Same Sex Marriage Will Change
Marriage for Everyone, 17 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 1, 7 (2014) (“I cannot help but think that same-sex
marriage, over time, will further the evolution of marriage away from its gendered meanings.”).
145. Martha C. Nussbaum, A Right to Marry?, 98 CAL. L. REV. 667, 694 (2010) (considering
“whether government should continue to offer a package of benefits similar to those offered in today’s
institution of marriage, or whether those benefits ought to be disaggregated and attached to a variety of
distinct relationships”); see also MICHAEL WARNER, THE TROUBLE WITH NORMAL: SEX, POLITICS,
AND THE ETHICS OF QUEER LIFE 81–148 (1999) (discussing the replacement of traditional marriage by a
wider variety of legal relationships).
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C. Disintegration
I borrow the title of this last approach—which this Article qualifiedly
defends—from Thomas Grey’s seminal article, The Disintegration of
Property.146 Grey’s article argues that the category of “property rights” no
longer picks out a well-defined set of claims. Property rights are not
invariably rights in tangible things, nor are they necessarily complete rights
over the objects in question.147 A variety of attempts to identify and cabin
the category of property rights—as rights with respect to real estate, as
rights against the world at large rather than against specific individuals, or
as rights enforced via injunctions rather than damages—are unavailing. At
the end of his article’s introduction, Grey proposes that “the specialists who
design and manipulate the legal structures of the advanced capitalist
economies could easily do without using the term ‘property’ at all.”148 At
the close of the same article, Grey predicts “the decline of property as a
central category of legal and political thought.”149
My proposal in this subpart is that we treat the categories of minddependent and mind-independent injury as Grey treated the category of
property. Rather than attempting to shore up the divide between the two, as
preservationist approaches do, or folding one into the other, as
assimilationist approaches do, the disintegration approach uses the pressure
neuroscience and the kinds of injuries discussed in Part II placed on the
distinction between mind-independent and mind-dependent injuries as a
starting point of a more extensive fragmentation of the larger category of
tortious injury. The disintegration approach asks us to replace a broadbrush rule (“mind-independent injuries are compensable, mind-dependent
ones aren’t”) with a case-by-case analysis. Rather than being able to advert
to a metaphysical or moral bright line to hive off some torts from others,
the disintegration approach asks us to look at each injury with new eyes,
and assess each on its merits to determine what legal response is
appropriate. It might recommend fuller compensation for some mindindependent injuries, but might equally recommend recognizing a broader
duty to take care of oneself for some physical injuries.
Cass Sunstein’s proposal that we differentiate injuries along a
permanent/temporary divide, rather than a mind-dependent/mindindependent divide,150 might be seen as representing one version of a
disintegration approach. Sunstein tacitly proposes the disintegration of one

146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

Thomas C. Grey, The Disintegration of Property, 22 NOMOS 69 (1980).
Id.
Id. at 73.
Id. at 82.
See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Illusory Losses, 37 J. LEGAL STUD. S157, S168 (2008).
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distinction, but its replacement by another binary distinction. Similarly,
Francis Shen discusses Joel Feinberg’s distinction between harm and mere
unpleasantness as a potential alternative to the mind-dependent/mindindependent distinction.151 In contrast, I suggest that the class of
compensable injuries might be best cross-cut by numerous distinctions and
categories, with greater attention to the details of particular injuries and a
greater willingness to face up to the idea that different actors owe different
duties of care.
In some ways, the disintegration approach harks back to an earlier era
of tort law. That earlier era relied more heavily on juries’ idiosyncratic
judgments.152 And it forthrightly acknowledged a multiplicity of different
standards for liability.153 However, a realistic approach to the law of torts as
it is actually developed in present-day legal practice further supports the
disintegration approach. In practice, we already draw many lines within the
category of mind-independent injuries. Some mind-independent injuries are
or have been subjected explicitly to special standards of care in the law.
Examples include strict liability for abnormally dangerous conduct,154
liability that extends to only “slight negligence” for certain businesses or
industries,155 or liability that applies a standard of care derived from
professional norms rather than a reasonableness standard.156 Others are
removed entirely from the reach of tort law and placed within a no-fault
insurance regime.157 Still others are implicitly known to be treated as
distinct in practice. For instance, empirical studies have shown that juries
are substantially more likely to award punitive damages in cases involving
intentional or business torts.158 Studies also suggest that juries differentiate
151. Shen, supra note 9, at 438–39 & n.152.
152. See, e.g., Michael D. Green, The Impact of the Civil Jury on American Tort Law, 38 PEPP.
L. REV. 337, 348 (2011) (arguing that “the history of tort law since the [1900s] has been the
development of various devices to control the jury, often covertly, and to shift to judges greater
authority over the outcome of tort cases”); Ann Woolhandler & Michael G. Collins, The Article III
Jury, 87 VA. L. REV. 587, 658–59 (2001) (recounting history of increasing encroachment on jury’s role
by judges).
153. Cf. Kurt Philip Autor, Note, Bailment Liability: Toward A Standard of Reasonable Care, 61
S. CAL. L. REV. 2117, 2119 (1988) (discussing and rejecting “traditional rules governing bailment
liability which rely on systems of classification and on varying degrees of care and negligence”).
154. E.g., In re Hanford Nuclear Reservation Litig., 534 F.3d 986, 1004 (9th Cir. 2008).
155. E.g., Williams v. Long Island R.R. Co., 196 F.3d 402, 406 (2d Cir. 1999).
156. Neil Vidmar, Empirical Evidence on the Deep Pockets Hypothesis: Jury Awards for Pain
and Suffering in Medical Malpractice Cases, 43 DUKE L.J. 217, 233 (1993) (“In automobile cases, as in
almost all other areas of torts, the negligence rules are based on the reasonable man standard. In
contrast, in medical malpractice cases, the rule is whether the health care provider’s treatment violated
professionally accepted standards of practice in his area of specialization, in that community, and
during that period of time.”).
157. See generally Robert L. Rabin, The Renaissance of Accident Law Plans Revisited, 64 MD.
L. REV. 699 (2005).
158. See Theodore Eisenberg et al., The Predictability of Punitive Damages, 26 J. LEGAL STUD.
623, 659 (1997).
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medical malpractice cases from product liability cases and cases involving
motor vehicle accidents, and potentially apply different standards to these
different types of cases.159
Indeed, even finer-grained classifications are frequently apparent: Peter
Hoffman notes, for instance, that “injuries resulting from rear-end
collisions are an extremely common type of claim. Perhaps because of their
frequency, the rules of liability are well-settled, and the driver of the
vehicle following behind almost always pays.”160 The rear-end collision
cases Hoffman discusses may well form a better-defined category within
the wider universe of injuries compensable in tort than either minddependent or mind-independent injuries do. Ultimately, the disintegration
approach may free us to face up to the fact that the actual law of injury and
compensation may in fact function like the sometimes-derided “law of the
horse,”161 with different rules for different social contexts, rather than
applying general principles that govern all mind-dependent and all mindindependent injuries respectively.
CONCLUSION
More than thirty years ago, Duncan Kennedy identified and proposed a
taxonomy that recapitulates the “six stages in a distinction’s passage from
robust good health to utter decrepitude.”162 Kennedy did not include the
distinction between mind-dependent and mind-independent harms among
the distinctions he discussed. But that distinction has arguably progressed
through several of Kennedy’s stages already. There have certainly been
“[h]ard cases with large stakes” that implicated the distinction, and there
have been intermediate classes of harms that exhibit features both of minddependent and mind-independent harm.163 And recent scientific findings
strongly suggest that the distinction has progressed further down the path
toward infirmity in recent years. Our improved understanding of the
biological correlates of mind-dependent harms suggests that the line

159. Vidmar, supra note 156, at 232; Paul C. Weiler, Fixing the Tail: The Place of Malpractice
in Health Care Reform, 47 RUTGERS L. REV. 1157, 1174 (1995).
160. Peter Toll Hoffman, Valuation of Cases for Settlement: Theory and Practice, 1991 J. DISP.
RESOL. 1, 13.
161. For criticism of a more contextual approach, see, for example, Seegars v. Gonzales, 396
F.3d 1248, 1254 (D.C. Cir. 2005); Karl N. Llewellyn, Across Sales on Horseback, 52 HARV. L. REV.
725, 737 (1939). For a different perspective, see Henry T. Greely, Some Thoughts on Academic Health
Law, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 391, 405 (2006) (“Applying an otherwise admirable privacy scheme,
for example, to health care, without a real knowledge of health care, may well be a mistake.”).
162. Duncan Kennedy, The Stages of the Decline of the Public/Private Distinction, 130 U. PA. L.
REV. 1349, 1350 (1982).
163. Cf. Kennedy, supra note 162, at 1350–51.
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between “body” and “mind” is no longer sufficient to support the
differential legal treatment of these harms.164
In Kennedy’s typology, what I have argued in the final part of this
Article might be understood as a brief for the “loopification” of our
understanding of the distinction between mind-dependent and mindindependent injuries. Loopification occurs, or so Kennedy argues, “when
the ends of the continuum seem closer to one another, in some moods (for
some purposes, in some cases), than either end seems to the middle.”165
Once a distinction has reached this stage, it loses its justificatory power.166 I
hope to have persuaded you that the putative distinction between mindindependent and mind-dependent injuries has now reached this stage. Many
mind-dependent injuries have more legally salient features in common with
mind-independent injuries than they have with fellow category members,
and vice versa. But that fact, as I have argued, does not support simply
assimilating the former to the latter. Rather, it opens a space for us to move
beyond that distinction altogether, and frees courts and juries to examine
new distinctions and classes of injury. No doubt these distinctions and
categories, too, will in time collapse as well—but it is time for them to
occupy a more central place in law, as the distinction this Article has
analyzed and criticized fades from the stage.

164. Cf. id. at 1351–52.
165. Id. at 1354.
166. See id. at 1357.

